



**CENTER ON  
INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION**

## **The United States in a Global Age: The Case for Multilateral Engagement**

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**PAYING FOR ESSENTIALS**  
A POLICY PAPER SERIES

## ABOUT THE CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The Center on International Cooperation at New York University was established in 1996 to conduct a program of policy research and international consultations on the preconditions for successful multilateral cooperation. As global integration accelerates, the world faces unprecedented transnational problems resistant to resolution by individual states. Governments that once assumed responsibility for a wide range of multilateral activities today lack the political will or practical capacity to sustain a wide array of international organizations, development aid programs, humanitarian assistance efforts, environmental agreements, and other global public goods that they have agreed to support. At the same time, important non-state actors, including corporations and not-for-profit groups, are exerting greater influence in the global arena. The cooperation of all these stakeholders is essential to develop appropriate strategies and mobilize the political will and financial resources necessary to meet global challenges in the years ahead.

The Center seeks to inform public debate on these matters by clarifying the economic, political, legal, and institutional foundations of effective multilateral action. Our current work examines the challenges of international cooperation in three specific sectors: international justice, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict peace-building. In addition, we have ongoing initiatives that address three broader themes: multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy; the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in the provision of international public goods; and the regional dimensions of international conflict.

Research papers and practical recommendations emanating from these projects are published in a policy paper series, "Paying for Essentials." Consulting with a wide range of interested parties, the Center hopes to build political consensus on essential multilateral activities and on the means to implement and sustain them.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## PREFACE

This paper outlines a new conceptual framework for U.S. foreign policy appropriate to a global age. It argues that constructive multilateral engagement is essential if the United States is to grapple with the challenges and take better advantage of the opportunities presented by globalization. The paper emerges from a collaborative study sponsored by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) to examine the causes and consequences of U.S. ambivalence toward multilateral cooperation.

This project had its origins in a paradox. Since World War II, the United States has done more than any other country to promote international law and intergovernmental organizations as critical foundations for global peace and prosperity. Yet, Americans have remained highly ambivalent about multilateral cooperation. Even as interdependence deepens and breeds multiple transnational problems like terrorism that no single country can resolve on its own, the United States is often reluctant to embrace international institutions and accept global commitments.

Seeking to explain this ambivalence and analyze its consequences, CIC in January 2000 launched a project on Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Supported by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and by the Ford and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur foundations, we assembled an interdisciplinary study group of academics and former government officials, as well as a board of distinguished advisors (see Appendices 1-2).

This report summarizes what we consider to be the main policy lessons of this study. It calls for new directions in the U.S. approach to global issues. It recommends a re-orientation in thinking about the relationship between U.S. national interests and the global interest; institutional reforms to the country's foreign policy apparatus; and comprehensive efforts to secure greater legislative and public awareness of America's interests in multilateral engagement. Specifically, we advocate a greater appreciation of the role of international institutions in advancing U.S. national interests; better coordination in the management and financing of the multiple domestic agencies that formulate and implement U.S. policy on global issues; a bipartisan Congressional review of our global interests and of the multilateral institutions and financial resources needed to meet them; and a broad-based process to mobilize public support for multilateral engagement. In short, we seek creative leadership of the sort the United States showed in embracing internationalism and multilateralism in the wake of World War II.

The views expressed in this paper represent the opinions of the authors themselves. The document does not provide guidance for U.S. policy in specific issue areas. We invite readers seeking more detail about the case studies upon which this paper is based to consult the book *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), edited by Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman. They may also wish to consult a companion volume devoted to international perspectives on U.S. unilateralism and multilateralism, edited by David Malone of the International Peace Academy and Yuen Foong Khong of Oxford University, forthcoming in autumn 2002. (See Appendices 3-4 for tables of contents of both books).

The Center on International Cooperation is committed to conducting policy relevant research and international consultations to advance multilateral management of today's pressing transnational challenges. We hope this policy paper will help U.S. policymakers and the American people reconsider the place of multilateral engagement in a global age.

## **WHY WE NEED TO RETHINK OUR APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY**

At various points in its history, the United States has adapted creatively to changing international conditions. After World War II, most famously, the country assumed global leadership, sponsoring an array of multilateral institutions to promote global security and cooperative economic relations. Despite the perils of the Cold War, these institutional foundations anchored the peace and prosperity of the free world for several decades. Today, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States faces a new challenge: adjusting its foreign policy vision and adapting domestic and international institutions to the demands of globalization.

Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. foreign policy agenda was being transformed by global problems that no single country, even with America's reach and power, could manage alone. As transnational flows of capital, goods, services, people, ideas, and information accelerate in velocity and swell in volume, the world is becoming increasingly integrated. The boundary between foreign and domestic policy is eroding, and the fates of peoples around the globe, from New York to Afghanistan, are becoming more intertwined.

These processes have already had profound implications for U.S. foreign policy. Alongside traditional diplomatic concerns, like ensuring the balance of power and maintaining alliances, the United States today confronts a new global agenda of transnational opportunities and threats. It must grapple with far-flung terrorist networks and criminal syndicates, environmental perils like climate change and the degradation of the world's oceans, growing global inequality, mass migration and humanitarian catastrophes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology, sudden financial crises that threaten global monetary stability, the spread of communicable diseases on an epidemic scale, challenges to democratization and human rights in strategic regions, and political conflict over scarce resources from oil to water. As the dividing line between foreign and domestic issues has blurred and as economies have become tied ever more closely to international markets, national objectives like financial stability, public health, and law enforcement have begun to take on characteristics of international public goods, dependent for their adequate provision on greater coordination and harmonization among governments across the globe.

The terrorist attacks themselves drove home, in the most horrifying manner, the profound capacity of transnational forces to influence U.S. national security. Groping for historical analogies of sufficient magnitude, many commentators invoked the memory of Pearl Harbor. The analogy reflected a widespread

recognition that neither U.S. foreign policy nor American society would be the same in the aftermath of this calamity. Much as December 7, 1941, “ended isolationism for any realist,” in the words of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, so September 2001 signaled U.S. vulnerability to global threats and the necessity for sustained international cooperation to confront them.

But the events of September 2001 also underlined how the international context in which the United States operates has been transformed over the past sixty years. Whereas Pearl Harbor was an act of war by one state against another, the attacks were launched on civilian populations by criminal non-state actors, using commercial instruments rather than traditional weapons of war. Similarly, the multifaceted U.S. response to these events -- the marshalling of a heterogeneous alliance including scores of countries and the deployment of a wide array of diplomatic, economic, criminal justice, and military tools – has reflected the new complexities and demands of managing globalization and interdependence. Today, U.S. policymakers and the public recognize that the nation’s fortunes are inextricably tied to global developments and transnational threats. As was the case sixty years ago, the United States must engage the world.<sup>i</sup>

Engagement can take many forms, however, and the decisions that the United States makes will determine its ability to shape a world consistent with its objectives and cherished values. One of the main lessons of the campaign against terrorism is the necessity for sustained multilateral engagement in confronting transnational challenges.

Before September 11, one of the main debates in U.S. foreign policy was whether the U.S. should go it alone or with others. The attacks exposed the unreality of this debate. To deal with the terrorist threat, there was no alternative to assembling a broad international coalition uniting, in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, “virtually every country in the world.” These multilateral investments paid handsome dividends, providing invaluable assistance in prosecuting the war, gathering intelligence, policing terrorist networks, tracing financial transactions, mobilizing reconstruction funds, and deploying peacekeepers to Afghanistan.

The United States now has an historic opportunity to lead the world in addressing the broader range of global challenges that increasingly dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda, including some of the conditions that breed terrorism. Successful U.S. leadership will require a new foreign policy vision that recognizes that the prosperity, security, and welfare of Americans is increasingly linked to the fortunes of other peoples around the world. Such a vision will acknowledge that the United States must work with other governments and with international institutions to address the practical dilemmas and take full advantage of the opportunities presented by global integration.

An effective policy of multilateral engagement will require institutional reform at both the global and domestic level. Internationally, the institutional architecture charged with regulating multiple spheres of activity is operating under increasing strain. Many intergovernmental organizations, inherited from previous decades and designed for different circumstances, are no longer adequate to the demands of globalization. They must be adapted to new realities, not least the growing role of private corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

International reform must be complemented by domestic reform. Within the U.S. executive branch, for example, the demands of globalization have drawn “domestic” agencies into the international arena. This involvement, which often comes at the expense of traditional foreign policy agencies, has complicated efforts at policy coordination within the federal government and resulted in a misalignment of institutional mandates and funding patterns.

The United States has exercised such creative leadership in the past. For over half a century, it has been helped build and sustain international institutions. At the end of World War II, with its might and influence at an historical zenith, the United States sponsored innovative frameworks for international cooperation at both the global and regional levels, beginning with the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the NATO alliance in the 1940s. Thanks in large measure to enlightened U.S. leadership, hundreds of intergovernmental organizations, regimes, and conventions have emerged in virtually every arena of human affairs, permitting functional collaboration in fields ranging from peace and security to trade and finance, environmental management, human rights, education, law enforcement, health, science and technology, and the use of the global commons.

These international institutions provide the practical basis, legal framework, and normative legitimacy for cooperative responses to transnational problems. They permit coordination and encourage cost sharing among participants, while limiting out-riding by those who would prefer not to follow the rules of the game and free riding by those who would rely on the beneficence of others.

This broadening and deepening of global cooperation has resulted in the emergence of what could be termed the “international public sector.”<sup>ii</sup> Around the world, nations and peoples have come to depend on goods and services provided by these international frameworks -- including those embodied in thousands of global conventions and treaties, in the more than 1,800 intergovernmental organizations that implement and monitor these agreements, and in the activities of the thousands of non-governmental organizations and tens of thousands of international civil servants that are active in their promotion and implementation.

Although largely unnoticed, this latticework of institutional cooperation has become indispensable for advancing U.S. and global interests. And it is likely to become even more important in the future. Looking to the year 2015, the CIA predicts:

multilateral arrangements increasingly will be called upon ... to deal with growing transnational problems.... And when international cooperation -- or international governance -- comes up short, the United States and other developed countries will have to broker solutions among a wide array of international players -- including governments at all levels, multinational corporations, and nonprofit organizations.<sup>iii</sup>

## UNDERSTANDING U.S. AMBIVALENCE AND SELECTIVITY

In view of these trends, it may seem paradoxical that the United States remains highly ambivalent about multilateral cooperation. On the one hand, the country continues to support a range of multilateral regimes, organizations, and partnerships, at both the regional and global level, from WTO, APEC, and NAFTA to the OAS, OSCE, and NATO. On the other, the U.S. foreign policy community is often divided over the merits of international institutions for advancing U.S. national interests. Whereas many Americans value multilateral institutions for their burden sharing and legitimating functions, others fear jeopardizing U.S. freedom of action abroad and national sovereignty at home.

In a number of prominent instances in recent years, the United States has chosen to opt out of particular treaties, to seek exemptions from proposed international regimes, or to respond to global challenges alone. Such episodes have sometimes exposed the United States – whether fairly or unfairly -- to charges of “unilateralism.”

These instances include U.S. rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; its pursuit of National Missile Defense and repudiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; its failure to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; its resistance to the optional verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention; its rejection of a proposed UN convention on small arms and light weapons; its failure to sign the Ottawa Convention banning production, trade, and use of anti-personnel land mines; its reluctance to authorize or participate in UN peace operations (particularly in Africa); its withholding of annual dues and peacekeeping assessments to UN; its imposition of extraterritorial sanctions (e.g. Helms-Burton Law); its failure to ratify certain human rights treaties, including Conventions on the Rights of the Child and the on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; and its repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming.

The wisdom of these decisions has been a matter of spirited debate within the U.S. foreign policy community, with reasonable people disagreeing about whether particular multilateral institutions, agreements, or frameworks of cooperation serve the interests of the United States or of the broader international community. In order to begin to judge these competing claims, we need to probe more deeply into the sources of U.S. misgivings about multilateralism and the potential consequences of U.S. decisions to opt out or act alone.

U.S. ambivalence toward multilateral cooperation has deep historical roots. The United States has long been of two minds about global engagement. No other nation has so fervently championed international institutions. Yet few have been so resistant to the constraints of multilateralism or so well positioned to obstruct it. There are various reasons for this ambivalence.

First, there is a natural desire on the part of the United States, as the world’s most powerful country, to maximize its *freedom of action* abroad. As the world’s sole superpower, it possesses unrivalled policy options. It can afford, at least in the short term, to bypass multilateral consultations and international institutions, to exploit its power in bilateral arrangements, or to rely on temporary coalitions in pursuing policy objectives. Moreover, the current scale of U.S. dominance can provide positive justifications for

acting alone. According to this argument, the United States has unique responsibilities to preserve global order. In discharging these responsibilities, it cannot afford to be hamstrung by global rules and institutions.<sup>iv</sup>

Just as there may be fear of losing U.S. freedom of action abroad, so there may be anxiety about losing *sovereignty* at home. As the scope of international regimes widens and as their provisions become more intrusive, some Americans perceive U.S. political institutions, domestic legal framework, and constitutional traditions as besieged by undemocratic and unaccountable organs of “global governance.” They fear that international rules and bodies will lack domestic standards of transparency, usurp the authority of the people’s elected representatives, and open domestic institutions and private enterprises to unwarranted external scrutiny. Defenders of US sovereignty espouse a doctrine of American “exceptionalism”, asserting the supremacy of domestic over international law and arguing that domestic standards of political legitimacy may require the U.S. to opt out of some international initiatives.

Other sources of U.S. ambivalence are structural, rooted in a constitutional *separation of powers* in which Congress and the executive branch vie for authority in international affairs. This shared mandate often complicates domestic approval of multilateral commitments (particularly treaties), especially when different parties control the White House and Congress. Competition between the executive and legislative branches can encourage healthy debate and ensure the sustainability of foreign policy initiatives. But it can also create fundamental conflict over the terms of U.S. international engagement and the country’s global obligations, particularly when partisanship runs high.

Finally, U.S. skepticism toward multilateral cooperation sometimes reflects a lack of faith in the capacity of inter-governmental organizations to accomplish the tasks with which they are charged; misgivings that the United States will be unable to control the agenda of international institutions; fears that the country will bear too great a burden for collective action; or concern that some international agreements are simply not in our national interest.

## THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT

The rise of global challenges to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda makes multilateral cooperation an increasingly indispensable vehicle for the pursuit of U.S. national interests and objectives. The country has little choice but to collaborate with foreign governments and international institutions in order to grapple with today's pressing transnational challenges, whether these involve managing the global commons, keeping peace in troubled regions, ensuring global financial stability, or curbing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In each of these realms – and so many others – multilateral frameworks for international cooperation permit the United States and its partners to consult, resolve differences, design solutions, share burdens and risks, coordinate action, and monitor and enforce commitments.

A strategy of multilateralism recognizes that the vigorous pursuit of U.S. national interests is often best accomplished through international institutions and partnerships. It recognizes that there are limits to going it alone, particularly in dealing with challenges that transcend national borders and elicit global concern. In most cases, multilateralism *expands* rather than restricts U.S. options, permitting the United States to achieve otherwise unreachable goals, to share burdens in pursuing these objectives, and – not least – to win legitimacy for its policies.

One of the dilemmas that the United States confronts in a “unipolar” world is how to exercise its overwhelming power in ways that neither threaten other countries nor encourage their resistance. Multilateralism provides a partial solution to this quandary. By exercising its leadership through consensual institutions that give voice and satisfaction to the less powerful while placing only modest constraints on its own policy autonomy and sovereign prerogatives, the United States can reassure weaker states that fear exploitation or abandonment, increase their willingness to follow the U.S. lead, and consolidate a productive and peaceful world that will advance long-term U.S. interests.<sup>v</sup>

### *The Costs of Acting Alone*

In the recent past, the United States has sometimes acted alone or opted out of multilateral initiatives to pursue immediate gain or avoid short-term pain, without due consideration of the long-term ramifications for its own national interests, the broader global interest in which it shares, or the sustainability of international institutions. Such uncritical ambivalence and shortsighted selectivity carries risks. Among other costs, it can:

- *Thwart the pursuit of coherent and effective policies toward particular global problems.* Internally divided about the merits of the International Criminal Court, for example, the Clinton Administration failed to propose a compelling alternative or launch a timely initiative to build support for its preferences. Now the United States faces the creation of a Court that could well come into conflict with U.S. objectives and complicate our security arrangements overseas.

- *Undermine collective responses to pressing transnational challenges.* The U.S. decision to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol without charting an alternative course, for example, has hindered prospects for a solution to the problem of global warming. (It also threatens to block American companies from participating in some economic opportunities available to firms from countries that have adopted the treaty).
- *Weaken international institutions critical to U.S. national interests:* By resisting a rigorous verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, for example, the United States may send an unfortunate signal to potential proliferators and increase its risk of eventual exposure to biological weapons.
- *Slow the spread of international norms and regimes:* By failing to ratify major human rights instruments, the United States may delay the formation of robust norms and undermine its own human rights advocacy abroad. Likewise, by rejecting the CTBT, the United States may jeopardize a longstanding bargain under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby the non-nuclear states have foresworn such weapons in return for a commitment by nuclear states to eventual nuclear disarmament.
- *Undermine cooperative security:* In the 1990s, the United States limited the UN's capacity to engage in peacekeeping by holding back U.S. dues, insisting on zero nominal growth of the UN budget, and opposing UN "nation-building" efforts. As a result, the UN has struggled to respond to U.S. requests for major peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, where the United States wants the UN and other nations to share the burden.
- *Hinder U.S. ability to mobilize the support of other countries:* Perceived U.S. high-handedness and selectivity toward international obligations can carry diplomatic costs, making it more difficult to forge coalitions or build support within international institutions. The prolonged crisis over U.S. arrears to the United Nations, for instance, undercut Washington's leadership position within the UN. As a result, the U.S. lost its seat on the influential budget oversight committee for several years in the late 1990s and, in May 2001, its seat on the Human Rights Commission. Similar resentment contributed to U.S. difficulties in rallying needed support for the U.S. position at the Durban Conference on racism, forcing the United States to withdraw from the gathering.<sup>vi</sup>
- *Jeopardize the values which the American public believes should be a major part of U.S. foreign policy and which gives the United States moral credibility with other nations.* Both the U.S. public and peoples around the world look to the United States to pursue policies consistent with its ideals. By providing only modest levels of political and financial support to important international

institutions, the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S. engagement abroad and risks undercutting the “soft power” that helps to sustain its global leadership in the eyes of foreign partners.

Given the drawbacks and limitations of acting alone, we believe that departures from multilateralism should be the exception rather than the rule.

#### *The Uses – and Limits -- of Unilateralism*

This general preference for multilateralism, of course, cannot be absolute. The United States obviously retains the sovereign right to reject proposed treaties, to remain aloof from international organizations, or to take independent foreign policy actions. Indeed, it must reserve the right to act alone when its national interest dictates. But accelerating global integration means that the instances when unilateralism is warranted will be relatively rare, being restricted to certain narrow circumstances.

For instance, unilateralism is clearly appropriate when U.S. national security or survival is gravely threatened and only independent action by the United States can preserve it. Similarly, the U.S. government would be justified in going it alone when multilateral cooperation clashes with the country’s fundamental interests or values, or in those instances when a moral imperative requires the United States to take unilateral action.

Finally, unilateral action may be called for when institutions are paralyzed from acting on an important global challenge -- and when acting alone is the only alternative to doing nothing. By taking the initiative, the United States may be able to mobilize a coalition of the willing or to create a new standard around which the international community might rally. In such circumstances, unilateral action may actually serve the long-term cause of multilateral cooperation.

In most circumstances, however, unilateralism is neither wise nor sustainable. Globalization has placed significant and growing limits on what the United States – for all its overwhelming power -- can accomplish by itself. Accordingly, the typical choice confronting the United States will not be between unilateral action and multilateral cooperation but among variants of the latter. In this regard, there is a lively debate currently going on between those who favor reliance on formal international institutions and organizations and those who would prefer to make use of ad hoc coalitions of the willing.

Inevitably, the United States will continue to rely on both types of multilateral cooperation, each of which has its own mixture of advantages and disadvantages. Ad hoc coalitions have the benefits of flexibility and fluidity, allowing interested countries to coalesce temporarily to respond to discrete international contingencies. More permanent institutions, on the other hand, often possess impressive standing capacities and carry greater legitimacy than ad hoc arrangements of only limited membership. The challenge for the United States will be to determine which form of cooperation has the greatest utility in meeting a given challenge. And it will need to ensure that reliance on temporary coalitions sustains and reinforces -- rather than undermines -- the more formal institutions (like the UN) and alliances (like

NATO) that the country will need to advance its national interests and global cooperation over the long haul.

Once we recognize that multilateralism is unavoidable in most cases, the task becomes one of making it more effective. This means overcoming the shortcomings that often plague international institutions, such as bureaucratic inertia, insufficient accountability, and lowest-common-denominator policymaking. A conscious strategy of multilateral engagement implies a commitment to correcting these deficiencies and improving the emerging framework of global cooperation.<sup>vii</sup> It means designing strategies that maximize the benefits of acting with others while minimizing the costs and constraints.

There are both material and normative reasons for the United States to be involved in shaping the global architecture required for multilateral action of the kind that globalization demands. No country has a greater capacity or responsibility to ensure that the emerging framework of international cooperation possesses adequate resources, accountability, and openness to effectively address transnational problems. Moreover, the country's partners and allies abroad look to it to take leadership. "Leadership" need not imply that the United States should take over or do all of the heavy lifting. Rather, it implies that the country should step forward and take the initiative in helping the international community solve problems of common concern.

A more consistent policy of multilateral engagement may require adjustments to some U.S. behaviors and expectations. It has been a longstanding presumption and practice of U.S. diplomacy that multilateral frameworks should confirm existing U.S. positions and that global regimes should constrain other countries' policies, rather than those of the United States. To continue to lead the world, the United States will need to balance its insistence on U.S. exceptionalism with the practical necessity of institutionalizing common norms and rules.

## **ADAPTING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO A GLOBAL AGE**

Even before the terrible events of September 11, 2001, the dividing line between foreign and domestic issues had become increasingly blurred. The domestic U.S. economy is ever more closely tied to global markets, and previously national issues like health, education, environmental protection, and crime are increasingly linked to their international dimensions. This interpenetration of domestic and international affairs poses significant challenges to the organization, management, and financing of U.S. foreign policy.

The Executive Branch is particularly ill structured to deal with the new global agenda. As transnational issues gain in importance, traditionally “domestic” departments and agencies have deepened their involvement in “foreign” policy matters. The State Department and the National Security Council, putatively charged with formulating and coordinating U.S. foreign policy, have struggled to keep up and to manage this new global agenda.

Both State and the NSC have long been used to the involvement of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign policy. But the field has gotten far more crowded recently, with various agencies taking the lead. The State Department, for example, has conceded much of the leadership on trade and commercial matters to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Department of Commerce, at a time when trade has become even more central to the country’s overseas interests. USTR is now the principal player in fashioning U.S. policy towards the WTO. In similar fashion, the Treasury Department now controls international financial policy. It took the lead during the Asian financial crisis of 1998, and it maintains a firm grasp on U.S. policy toward the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the regional development banks.<sup>viii</sup>

In the security and law enforcement area, meanwhile, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have all expanded their presence abroad. The FBI has opened offices in Western Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and across Africa. The recent emphasis on anti-terrorism activities will surely increase the Justice Department’s direct role overseas.

The increasing impact of global issues on all aspects of American life has caused other putatively domestic departments to expand their activities abroad. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has adopted a proactive international agenda that focuses on controlling and preventing communicable diseases, contingency planning for potential biological and chemical terrorism, improving the infrastructure of public health in foreign countries, and spreading the benefits of medical research globally.<sup>ix</sup> Similarly, the Department of Energy not only plays a leading role in negotiating price movements with OPEC members but also undertakes energy studies for other governments, convenes meetings of oil ministers, and provides technical assistance to foreign governments on everything from overall energy policy to the containment of oil spills.

This increased international involvement of traditional domestic agencies is to some degree inevitable. At present, the State Department is simply ill equipped to handle many of the most important

transnational problems.<sup>x</sup> It frequently lacks the scientific expertise and staff capacity to grapple with technical complexities surrounding issues like international health, climate change, and protection of the global environment.

But divided responsibility for international affairs can hinder foreign policy coherence, contributing to fractured and conflicting policies toward multilateral institutions. As responsibility for global issues shifts to traditional domestic agencies, where requisite expertise remains concentrated, State must find ways to integrate its political skills with their technical expertise and put forth a consistent framework for multilateral cooperation.

The same is true in the management of the U.S. foreign aid program, where the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) struggles to keep up with the burgeoning and quite legitimate global interests of U.S. domestic agencies, such as DOE's growing role in Africa. As its funds have declined, USAID has struggled to retain overall control over foreign assistance policy. If USAID is to reassert a coordinating role, however, it will need to reassess its own ambivalence toward multilateral cooperation: USAID is generally disdainful of multilateral development programs, which it sees as competing directly with its own bilateral ones. For example, the agency has shown inconsistent support for such major international initiatives as the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

#### *Improving Foreign Policy Coordination*

More effective U.S. responses to today's transnational problems will require improved collaboration between traditional foreign policy actors and domestic agencies now involved in global activities. The most dramatic recent effort to bridge these substantive and bureaucratic divides has been the response to terrorism. Few issues cut across domestic and international lines so clearly. More than forty agencies, including Justice, CIA, Defense, State, Health and Human Services, and Transportation – as well as state and local governments -- are involved. This is a massive effort, the outcome of which promises to shape not only the future of U.S. foreign policy but indeed the fabric of daily life in the United States itself, from our judicial and law enforcement institutions to our travel alternatives to our health and welfare programs. To meet this challenge, President Bush has created the Cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security. How this office coordinates with others, under what authority, and with what financial resources, have become major issues in determining the scope of its mandate.

A range of other global issues requires similar inter-agency coordination. To date, however, the solutions have tended to be ad hoc. For example, the Clinton Administration designated HIV/AIDS as a national security issue, assigning staff and giving authority to the NSC to confront the global epidemic, while simultaneously elevating the National AIDS Coordinator (outside the NSC) as a Special Envoy on the matter. The Bush Administration abolished the relevant expert position in the NSC but established an inter-departmental coordinating committee, headed by the Secretaries of State and HHS, to address the problem. The issue of debt relief for poorer nations provides another example. Under President Clinton, the National Economic Advisor took on the major coordinating role in this arena, with the NSC playing a minor role. The Bush Administration is experimenting with joint coordination of international economic issues by the NSC and the National Economic Advisor.

The lessons of these experiments may be instructive, but in the longer run a more fundamental reordering of White House coordination of foreign policy will be required. One approach might be for the Administration to designate certain issues as “global” -- or as possessing equal domestic and international concern -- and to establish coordinating mechanisms accordingly. Alternatively, a thorough restructuring of the National Security Council, in conjunction with other White House offices, may be in order. Regardless, traditional foreign policy agencies like the State Department and USAID must adapt to new definitions of “foreign policy” and find better ways to tap into the expertise that resides in the “domestic” agencies.<sup>xi</sup>

Accomplishing such shared responsibility is complicated by current funding patterns, which give the State Department the primary budget, outside the International Financial Institutions, to support multilateral cooperation. Domestic agencies like HHS, Labor, and Agriculture already possess the primary role for maintaining professional and policy relationships with the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture organization (FAO), respectively. However, because the budgets for U.S. contributions to UN agencies lie elsewhere -- with State and to some extent USAID -- there is a constant struggle over U.S. policy. For example, USDA’s interest in FAO focuses almost exclusively on trade, whereas State and USAID, responsive to the demands of other FAO member states, show more concern with issues of hunger and food security in developing countries. Likewise, the Labor Department’s interest in ILO is intermittent at best and reflects largely domestic political pressures.

Clearly, new funding and organizational arrangements are necessary to accommodate the changing nature of U.S. global interests. One proposal is that as domestic agencies take on larger international roles, whether bilateral or multilateral, they should also assume a larger responsibility for financing them. Under such a principle, U.S. dues for WHO would be included in the HHS budget, those for the ILO in the Labor budget (etc.). Likewise, bilateral projects undertaken by these departments would not remain dependent upon USAID resources but be incorporated in the budget of the sponsoring department. Under such an arrangement, financing for the broad range of America’s role in the world would be extracted from the narrow funding limits currently imposed on “international” activities. At present, total funding for the country’s international activities outside military and intelligence spending (the so-called “150 Account”) constitutes less than 1% of the federal budget -- and only one sixteenth of the resources devoted to national defense.

Disaggregating federal spending on global issues could also free such activities from the negative attitude and cumbersome strictures, such as zero nominal growth, that Congressional committees have applied to multilateral agencies. Presumably, also, domestic constituencies would be activated on behalf of these programs, as the interconnectedness between international activities and domestic interests becomes clearer.

An argument against shifting federal funding for international activities in this manner is that doing so would further fragment responsibility for coordinating U.S. foreign policy. Domestic agencies would have even less reason to check with State or USAID before launching initiatives in various countries or in multilateral institutions. One could imagine instances in which different U.S. agencies might duplicate each

other's activities or work at cross-purposes in delicate political situations.

An even greater danger, however, is that federal funding for essential international programs would decrease rather than increase. Congressional committees that control the budgets of domestic agencies traditionally have resisted the latter's involvement in activities that appear to divert funds and attention from "domestic" concerns. Still, one should not dismiss this approach out of hand, nor shrink from exploring wholly new ways to manage problems that cross the domestic-foreign frontier. For, clearly, the present system of management and funding is inadequate and obsolete.

## **Engaging Congress**

Congress, too, must adapt to an era of globalization. At pivotal moments in the twentieth century, Congress asserted leadership in critical foreign policy debates and provided solid substantive and procedural support for U.S. global engagement. After World War II, Congressional leaders joined with the Truman Administration to forge an enduring bipartisan consensus behind the defense of the free world and the containment of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, although serious differences sometimes arose (most notably during the Vietnam War), the key Congressional committees possessed a common understanding about the basic goals of U.S. foreign policy and exercised strong leadership to advance these.

During the first post-Cold War decade, Congressional leadership in foreign affairs decreased markedly. In both the Senate and the House, foreign affairs committees failed to enact key legislation, to attract senior members, or to exert strong influence. In part, this reflected competing domestic priorities, as well as the rising salience of issues straddling the boundary between domestic and foreign affairs, which attracted the attention of other committees.

Another impediment to Congressional leadership was a precipitous rise in partisanship, which sometimes paralyzed the foreign policy agenda.<sup>xii</sup> With the end of the Cold War, it became less risky for Congress to take more extreme positions than the White House on international affairs and to inject single (and often purely domestic) interests into matters of foreign policy. For example, abortion opponents on the House International Relations Committee successfully blocked for two years the Clinton Administration's (and for that matter the Senate's) efforts to pay U.S. arrears to the United Nations. With the decline of the seniority system and other changes in congressional and party management, individual members found it easier to serve as foreign policy entrepreneurs. The result was to render Congressional policymaking more decentralized and – at times -- incoherent.

The growing importance of issues like trade or immigration, which crossed the line between foreign and domestic spheres, had both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, it engaged members outside the traditional foreign relations committees on global issues. Legislators from agricultural states became concerned not only with trade but with sanctions that inhibited trade, with international institutions that stabilized the economies of trading partners, and with other, indirectly related foreign policy issues.

Leadership on these issues often came not from the traditional foreign policy committees but elsewhere. Within the Senate, the Banking Committee assumed greater prominence, for instance, in increasing the quota for the IMF or responding to financial crises in Mexico and Asia. Likewise, the Agriculture Committee in both houses and the joint Economic Committees played prominent roles in reducing sanctions on India and Pakistan after those committees conducted nuclear tests, largely in response to the special interest of agricultural producers.

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terrorism will undoubtedly have a major impact on how Congress addresses transnational issues in the future. Already, it is clear that international events now command more attention within Congress and, indeed, constitute the primary interest of some of its most senior and prominent members. Seminars, special breakfasts, and briefings on international affairs are attracting record numbers of legislators and members of their staffs. Bipartisanship in foreign policy has returned, at least temporarily, with rapid passage of key anti-terrorism legislation, the payment of UN arrears, and strong support of the war in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, even as Congress becomes more focused on and knowledgeable about international issues, persistent structural problems inhibit new funding and organizational arrangements. With few exceptions, such as in the banking and more recently agriculture committees, the committee structure of Congress remains sharply divided into categories of domestic and foreign policy. In this regard, committees that control the budgets of the departments of the Interior, Health and Human Services, Labor, Energy, and Transportation and of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) remain focused on domestic programs and often seek to limit these agencies' conduct of international programs. In response, "domestic" departments often bury their global activities in other line items, so that it is difficult even to know how much is spent on them.<sup>xiii</sup>

In the past, Congress has occasionally recognized and responded to crosscutting issues by establishing so-called select committees, such as one on Hunger chaired by the late Mickey Leland and later by Tony Hall, and on drugs chaired by Charles Rangel. Unfortunately, such committees were abolished in the Gingrich-led Republican "revolution" during the 105<sup>th</sup> Congress. If such committees are no longer practical, it may be time to examine more fundamentally how Congress should address the more complex world agenda, perhaps by convening a Congressional hearing on this question.

Although the war on terrorism has turned Congress's attention toward foreign affairs and to the necessity of at least nominal support for multilateral cooperation, the need for a long term coalition to address the terrorist threat will inevitably draw the United States into other, broader issues that occupy the attention of our allies, such as poverty, trade, disease, the environment, and sustainable development. Congress will need to look carefully at how the foreign policy apparatus of the United States is organized to address this wider set of global issues. Such organizational questions will lead Congress to consider the ways in which various executive branch departments are funded, the effectiveness of current mechanisms of Congressional oversight, and whether Congress itself must undertake organizational reforms to support this new mandate.

Inherent in such an examination will be the question of how the United States should view its relations with the international system. Here, again, Congressional attitudes will be critical. The war on terrorism has allowed the Congress to put aside some of the more ideological opposition to the United Nations -- and to multilateral cooperation in general -- that so dominated the last decade of the twentieth

century. But more will be required if the U.S. is to develop a coherent and sustained multilateral response to the broad range of global issues the country now must confront.

There are many ways in which Congress can begin to examine these questions, including committee by committee, but conditions may be propitious for the creation of a bipartisan commission to examine in more general terms U.S. interests in multilateral engagement and how they can best be achieved. Advocates of multilateral cooperation could use such settings to demonstrate to Congressional skeptics exactly how transnational challenges impinge on the interest of their constituents and how cooperation with other governments and international institutions can help address the dilemmas and opportunities they face. Such a commission, by establishing effective mechanisms of accountability and addressing traditional U.S. concerns about international institutions, might help to build a solid, bipartisan foundation for the country's multilateral engagement.

## **Partnering with Private Actors**

We now face a world in which non-state actors, including transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations and civil society movements, have become major players in the global marketplace.<sup>xiv</sup> This private sector, including both its profit-making and not-for-profit components, accounts for the vast number of international transactions that drive globalization and interdependence, even while the inter-governmental organizations and mechanisms established to manage such transactions continue to be dominated by states.

One of the most remarkable developments in international affairs in recent years has been the growth in the activism and influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Today, more than 30,000 international and community-based NGOs operate programs around the world. In the fields of economic development and humanitarian assistance alone, more than 4000 Northern-based NGOs disburse \$3 billion in foreign aid. Approximately 60% of the foreign disaster assistance of the United States government is programmed through NGOs.<sup>xv</sup>

These NGOs have steadily organized themselves to influence governments toward new agreements and institutions. The agenda of multilateral gatherings is increasingly shaped by NGOs able to direct global attention to particular issues (like land mines or unfair labor practices) and to mobilize transnational coalitions behind new norms and standards. Their most notable achievement to date was the campaign resulting in a treaty to ban landmines. The leaders of this effort, which was hailed as a precedent for the democratization of international lawmaking, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. A second major success was the pressure NGOs placed on governments to sign the treaty for an International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. In both cases the U.S. Government found itself unable to interact effectively with these movements, and the United States became isolated in the presence of overwhelming international pressure.

The NGO phenomenon reflects the simultaneously integrating and fragmenting impact of globalization. On the one hand, NGO alliances cross borders, connect once disparate communities, and

exploit the technology of instant, inexpensive communication – particularly the internet – to multiply their numbers, coordinate their actions, and move quickly from national to international coalitions. At the same time, they represent a revolt against established nation-state policy structures and international organizations charged with managing global interdependence. Thus they rely on the fragmentation that has accompanied globalization to mobilize adherents, reaching into local communities, marginalized groups, and disaffected interests to build support from the grassroots. This dual strategy has been evident in the demonstrations against the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF that have been going on since 1999.<sup>xvi</sup>

NGOs are a heterogeneous lot, and their activism has ambiguous implications for U.S. multilateralism. Some NGOs seek to democratize international institutions and to make them more transparent and accountable. But others are profoundly uneasy with the multilateral demands of globalization itself and seek to abolish international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF entirely. Nowhere was this contradiction -- between reaching for global norms and retreating from international mechanisms -- more evident than in the November 1999 protests at Seattle, where critics attacked the WTO as a faceless and non-transparent organization but in the same breath called for it to be strengthened.<sup>xvii</sup>

Non-governmental organizations are an inevitable attribute of any open, democratic society. At the global level, the increased activism of transnational NGOs can easily be seen as the healthy embodiment of an emerging “global civil society.” Such NGOs can bring enormous energy, expertise, and capacity to the solution of global problems, as is evident in a growing number of public-private partnerships and policy networks to deal with issues as far flung as development aid, clean water, and health.<sup>xviii</sup> At the same time, there is considerable debate within the United States and abroad about how this increased activism should be accommodated within international organizations and global regimes. Some critics fear that the dominant transnational NGOs are inadequately representative of the range of global opinion. Others worry that permitting NGO involvement in decision-making may infringe on the prerogatives of national governments. Still others have been alarmed at the decidedly anti-American tone that NGO coalitions have sometimes brought to the table, such as in the negotiations over the International Criminal Court in summer 1998. Such shortcomings can detract from their often-laudable objectives.

The challenge for the U.S. government is to encourage constructive involvement by transnational NGOs. U.S. officials must commit to ongoing and timely consultations with a broad range of interested parties and seek direct partnerships where mutual objectives can be advanced. Such partnerships are already common practice in the field of humanitarian assistance.

The United States must also consider creative partnerships with private companies, which are playing an increasingly important role in the multilateral management of global challenges. The United Nations, for example, has enlisted hundreds of corporations in its Global Compact to promote responsible practice in the areas of human rights and environmental protection. Discussions are advancing in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction as well.

Another form of non-governmental activism might be called the “privatization of foreign policy.” This is the entrée into foreign policy of well-financed individuals, including wealthy philanthropists. This is not a new phenomenon, nor restricted to Americans, but it has had a striking impact on multilateral cooperation in recent years. Over the past decade, a number of wealthy individuals have chosen to devote significant private money to worthy global causes. In some cases, they have done so in response to a vacuum of public money and a perceived abdication of governmental responsibility. A significant part of

Ted Turner's \$1 billion "gift" to the United Nations, for instance, was used in its first two years to launch a mega-media campaign to convince Congress to pay the country's UN arrears. More unusual was Turner's provision of \$34 million to the UN in 2000 to cover the first year's costs to other nations of lowering U.S. dues from 25 to 22 percent. Private money, in effect, was used to pay for a U.S. foreign policy objective.

In a different vein, Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, has changed the focus of international health efforts by providing a massive gift to a program, managed jointly by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the WHO, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), to produce vaccines for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. Gates' contribution dwarfs previous U.S. government contributions to research in this field and makes the Gates Foundation a principal partner of the WHO.

These forms of philanthropy may seem all to the good, especially for the cause of multilateralism. But one can think of other more controversial causes, heavily financed, producing private linkages to multilateral institutions, which would give pause. Some developing nations have raised questions about UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's efforts to engage the business sector in partnership with the UN both in setting norms for the behavior of transnational firms and for carrying out UN-sponsored development programs, fearing that such arrangements might give private actors special entrée or undue influence and compromise the independence of the UN.

These concerns point to the need for a more clearly formulated approach to the growing role of the private sector, with all its clear potential for adding to the effectiveness of multilateral efforts. As globalization deepens and the capacity of the international public sector is stretched thin, the United States and its international partners will need to explore new partnerships between the public and the private sectors, including both its profit and nonprofit wings.

### **Building a Public Constituency**

The American public is neither unaware of global issues nor unappreciative of the nation's international responsibilities. Indeed, polls consistently show that a sizeable majority of the citizenry supports an active U.S. role in the world, recognizes the benefits of freer trade, desires the inclusion of human rights and social concerns in foreign policy, believes the United States has an obligation to help poorer nations, and prefers that U.S. involvement in peacekeeping or other international military action be undertaken in conjunction with the United Nations, an organization to which the public gives high marks.<sup>xix</sup> The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to greater public engagement in international affairs. But if the public places a priority on the war on terrorism, they remain interested in programs that address broader international concerns like the eradication of world poverty, the fostering of a cleaner environment, and improvements in global health.

The American people have long been more internationalist – and multilateralist – than either political elites or the media assume. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, the public favors not only a cooperative U.S. foreign policy but also one with strong social and ethical content. Americans strongly believe that the United States has a responsibility to shoulder its "fair share" of international burdens. Accordingly, the public prefers to address global challenges through multilateral institutions and partnerships, rather than doing more on its own or relying on others to do work for them. Public support for

the United Nations is particularly robust, since the UN not only embodies burden sharing but also provides a mantle of legitimacy for U.S. actions abroad, including military action. This preference for multilateral cooperation extends to other global challenges, with the public indicating support for binding regimes to protect the world's environment and stronger legal institutions like the International Criminal Court.

Yet, until the events of September 11, this preference for engagement was held without a great deal of passion, thereby insulating elected representatives from being held accountable for their foreign policy positions. Moreover, the public is less clear in its opinions about specific programmatic responses to global issues.<sup>xx</sup>

The public also has an exaggerated view of the U.S. role, consistently overestimating the magnitude of U.S. foreign aid (or troop contributions to UN peacekeeping) by as much as fifteen times the actual amount. This may be the result of media coverage, or it may reflect deeper psychological forces: Americans hold strongly to the image of the United States as a generous nation – so strongly, in fact, that accurate information about the modest scale of U.S. contributions to foreign assistance and other international activities does not necessarily change their original perception that the United States is carrying a heavy burden.

Engaging the public more actively on the global agenda will be critical if the United States is to sustain the long-term multilateral cooperation needed to cope with the dilemmas of interdependence. The public's generally favorable attitude toward multilateralism gives hope to those advocating greater U.S. engagement on transnational issues. But much depends on how the United States government and the media frame America's response to the terrorist attack.

Clearly a message emphasizing war, terrorist threats, and the need for special defensive measures was understandable in the initial months after September 11. But it would be a mistake to persist in a message that paints the world exclusively in negative terms -- as a place where only defensive actions, rather than constructive programs, are called for. Such a bleak vision will not resonate with the public nor engage its sustained support. Only a positive message, one that taps into the best and deepest American values and focuses on the type of world we seek – and not merely what we are fighting against -- will secure sustained public support for international engagement. In focus groups, Americans have consistently revealed their preference for a foreign policy that embodies a broader social and ethical purpose, that entails a fair but responsible sharing of the world's burdens, and that allows the United States to play the role of a good global citizen.

To mobilize their fellow citizens, U.S. policymakers will need to confront their own ambivalence about the public's role in foreign affairs. Political elites, within Congress and the executive branch, are often tempted to try to insulate international affairs from public engagement. Too often, they assume that the positions taken by the media, their peers, or think tank experts are accurate gauges of public attitudes. This tends to shut the public out from the policy process, with the exception of simple, rapid polling, and it helps to magnify the influence of single-issue interest groups, which may be impervious to broader national interests.

The complexity of the global challenges facing the United States magnifies the risks of such misconceptions. As the boundary between domestic and foreign affairs continues to erode, global issues increasingly affect the everyday lives of Americans. Engaging the public positively and effectively on these issues will lead the United States to a stronger, more principled foreign policy appropriate to the age in which we now live.

## THE ROAD AHEAD

Despite the growing linkages between the United States and the rest of the world and the rise of global challenges not amenable to unilateral action, the United States remains deeply ambivalent about multilateral cooperation and international institutions. A more constructive attitude is required, beginning with a renewed appreciation of the indispensability of multilateral frameworks in achieving the country's most important national objectives. At this critical juncture in world history, the United States must again step forward to lead the international community in shaping an effective institutional architecture to address global problems.

More effective multilateral engagement will require a practical reorientation of U.S. foreign policy, with leadership coming from both the White House and Congress. It will require a restructuring of the Executive Branch to match current global realities; greater involvement of the Legislative Branch on transnational issues; innovative partnerships between the U.S. government and private actors; and greater public awareness about America's interest in multilateral cooperation.

While precise recommendations regarding institutional reform and policy orientations will await further study, we propose a number of initial steps to improve the nation's capacities for multilateral engagement. Specifically, we recommend that:

- The Administration and Congress recognize that a foreign policy fundamentally oriented toward strengthening multilateralism provides the most promising means for advancing U.S. interests in an interdependent world;
- The Administration articulate to our allies and to other nations a policy framework that assures them of our intention to build an international system of cooperation and burden-sharing, one that preserves our ability to act alone where vital US interests or major humanitarian concerns demand but also ensures that any such action will proceed with the maximum practical level of consultation and coalition building;
- For the purposes of the above, the President appoint a bipartisan commission to address the changing nature of U.S. national interests in a global age and the central role of the United States in shaping the appropriate international architecture for the twenty-first century;
- The White House take the lead in adapting Executive Branch structures to meet transnational challenges that cross current agency and departmental boundaries;

- Congress hold hearings to analyze how the apparatus of U.S. foreign policy and its own committee structures should adapt to the new global agenda and to the need for strengthened multilateral cooperation, and to consider how the United States, consistent with its democratic principles, can best accommodate the increasing role of non-state actors in world politics;
- Congress take steps to ensure adequate U.S. support for essential activities and develop new mechanisms to monitor the performance and accountability of international institutions;
- The White House and Congress employ all available opportunities, including regular media briefings, to engage the U.S. public about the implications of globalization for U.S. national interests, beyond the war on terrorism, and about the value of international cooperation in addressing them.

## **APPENDICES**

### **Appendix 1: MULTILATERALISM ADVISORY BOARD**

**John Brademas**, Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy and President Emeritus, New York University.

**Colin Campbell**, President, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation.

**Lee Hamilton**, Director, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Former ranking Democrat, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

**Rita Hauser**, President, the Hauser Foundation.

**Mahnaz Ispahani**, Deputy Director, Human Rights and International Cooperation, the Ford Foundation.

**Henry Kaufman**, President, Henry Kaufman and Company.

**Abraham F. Lowenthal**, President, Pacific Council on International Policy.

**William Luers**, Chairman and President of the United Nations Association of the United States of America.

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**Joseph S. Nye**, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

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**Kimberly Ann Elliot**, Research Fellow, Institute for International Economics.

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**Thomas Graham, Jr.**, President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security.

**Gary Hufbauer**, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics.

**G. John Ikenberry**, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice, Georgetown University.

**Harold K. Jacobson**, Jesse Siddal Reeves Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.

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*Steven Kull, Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland.*

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**Princeton N. Lyman**, Executive Director, Global Interdependence Initiative, Aspen Institute.

**Michael Mastanduno**, Professor of Government, Dartmouth College.

**Karen A. Mingst**, Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.

**Andrew Moravcsik**, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Center, Harvard University.

**Stewart Patrick**, Research Associate, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

**Sarah Sewall**, Program Director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University.

**Amy E. Smithson**, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center

**William Wallace** (Lord Wallace of Saltaire), Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics.

**Ruth Wedgwood**, Professor, Yale University Law School.

### APPENDIX 3: EDITED VOLUME

#### *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*

Edited by Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman

1. Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S. Ambivalence -- *Stewart Patrick*

#### Part I: Dimensions of U.S. Multilateralism

2. The United States, International Organizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy --*Edward C. Luck*

3. The Growing Influence of Domestic Factors --*Princeton N. Lyman*

4. Multilateralism and the American Public -- *Steven Kull*

5. Multilateralism and American Grand Strategy --*G. John Ikenberry*

6. U.S. Unilateralism: A European Perspective --*William Wallace*

#### Part II: Policy In Practice

7. Unilateral Action in a Multilateral World -- *Ruth Wedgwood*

8. Multilateral Peace Operations -- *Sarah B. Sewall*

9. Nuclear Weapons: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and National Missile Defense --*Thomas Graham, Jr., and Damien J. LaVera*

10. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- *Amy E. Smithson*

11. The U.S. as “Deadbeat”? The United States and the UN Financial Crisis -- *Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst*

12. Extraterritorial Sanctions: Managing “Hyper-Unilateralism” in U.S. Foreign Policy -- *Michael Mastanduno*
13. Unilateralism, Multilateralism, and the International Criminal Court – *Bartram S. Brown*
14. Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist? -- *Andrew Moravcsik*
15. Ambivalent Multilateralism and the Emerging Backlash: The WTO and IMF -- *Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer*
16. Climate Change: Unilateralism, Realism, and Two-Level Games -- *Harold K. Jacobson*
17. Multilateralism as a Matter of Fact: U.S. Leadership and the Management of the International Public Sector – *Shepard Forman*

#### **APPENDIX 4:**

##### ***International Perspectives on U.S. Unilateralism and Multilateralism***

Edited by David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong

1. Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives -- *David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong*
2. A Decade of American Unilateralism? – *David Malone*  

The Rule of Law
3. Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International Law in U.S. Foreign Policy – *Nico Krisch*
4. The United States and the International Criminal Court – *Georg Nolte*
5. Credibility at Stake: Domestic Supremacy in U.S. Human Rights Policy -- *Rosemary Foot*
6. Unilateralism, Multilateralism, and U.S. Drug Diplomacy: The Politics of the Certification Process in

Latin America – *Monica Serrano*

Peace and Security

7. The United Nations and the United States: An Indispensable Partnership  
-- *Kishore Mahbubani*
8. UN Peace Operations and U.S. Unilateralism and Multilateralism -- *Ramesh Thakur*
9. The Unilateral and Multilateral Use of Force by the United States: A View from Russia – *Ekaterina Stepanova*
10. In Search of Absolute Security: A Chinese Perspective on U.S. Nuclear Policy – *Qingguo Jia*
11. U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy After the Cold War: The NPT and CTBT-- *Kanti Bajpai*

Trade and the Environment

12. Unilateralism and Multilateralism in U.S. Trade Policy: Alternative Tacks or Parallel Tracks? –  
*Per Magnus Wijkman*
13. The United States in the Global Financial Arena – *Toyoo Gyohten*
14. Unilateralism in Climate Change Policy: Is the United States Turning its Back to the World and Facing a Mirror? -- *Lucas Assunção*

Regional Perspectives

15. Unilateralism and Multilateralism: A Diplomatic Perspective from Latin America – *Gelson Fonseca*
16. U.S. Unilateralism versus Multilateralism: An African Perspective -- *Chris Landsberg*
17. U.S. Engagement in the Asia-Pacific: Bilateralism Plus “Multilateralism a la Carte” – *Andrew Mack*
18. The United States and the Western Alliance – *Sophia Clément*
19. Conclusion –*David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong*

## NOTES

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<sup>i</sup> *America Must Engage the World*

<sup>ii</sup> Shepard Forman, "Multilateralism as a Matter of Fact: U.S. Leadership and the Management of the International Public Sector," in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

<sup>iii</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, p.13.

<sup>iv</sup> The Clinton Administration invoked this argument in seeking exemptions from the ICC and the land mines ban. Peter Malanzuk, "The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What Are the Consequences of Leaving the US Behind?," *European Journal of International Law* 11, 1 (2000): 77-90

<sup>v</sup>For an extended treatment of the national interest rationale for binding the United States to international institutions, see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*.

<sup>vi</sup>Congressman Tom Lantos claims resentment at U.S. attitudes toward multilateral cooperation discouraged European and other countries from to support the U.S. position at Durban. "The Durban Debacle: An Insider's View of the World Racism Conference at Durban," in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 2002, Volume 26:1.

<sup>vii</sup> For example, the United States should continue its efforts to foster UN budgetary and administrative reform, in the interest of creating a more streamlined and efficient United Nations. Similarly, it might push for stricter criteria for election to the UN Human Rights Commission, as well as improvements in the implementation and accountability of multilateral development assistance programs. Such reforms will be possible only if the United States dedicates itself to constructive engagement, as an active participant in indispensable -- if occasionally frustrating -- multilateral bodies.

<sup>viii</sup> Gopinath, "Who's the Boss?" pp. 89-94.

<sup>ix</sup> The Department has established a new website, Globalhealth.gov, as a portal of information on global health and the Department's role.

<sup>x</sup> NRC, *The Pervasive Role of Science Technology, and Health in Foreign Policy*.

<sup>xi</sup> Gelman, "Turf Battles Slow Appointment of US AIDS Envoy," p. A16.

<sup>xii</sup> Deibel, *Clinton and Congress*, pp. 3-5, 59-70.

<sup>xiii</sup> In 1994, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated these expenditures at \$1 billion. There has been no official updating since. Lancaster, *Transforming Foreign Aid*, p. 12.

<sup>xiv</sup> Florini, ed., *The Third Force*; Mathews, "Delinquent Diplomacy."

<sup>xv</sup> Forman and Stoddard, "International Assistance."

<sup>xvi</sup> Guay, "Local Government and Global Politics," p. 363.

<sup>xvii</sup> Naim, "Lori's War," pp. 34-41, 52. See also, Lewis, "No Ideological Potion," p. 8.

<sup>xviii</sup> Wolfgang Reineicke, *Global Public Goods*.

<sup>xix</sup> Kull, "Multilateralism and the American Public." Also, Kull, et al, *The Foreign Policy Gap*, pp. 15-23, 172-184.

<sup>xx</sup> Bales, "Communicating Global Interdependence," pp. 11-12. See also Ethel Klein/EDK Associates, *Becoming Global Citizens*, pp. 29-32. Low levels of general public engagement distorts policy choices "to favor the noisy few over the quiet many." Lindsay, "The New Apathy," p. 2.

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) delivers innovative learning solutions to enhance global decision-making and support country-level action for shaping a better future. Over the years, UNITAR has acquired unique expertise in the provision of customized and creative learning solutions to institutions and individuals from both public and private sectors. **REQUIRE SUPPORT** Developing countries may require capacity-building support in a range of areas, including national data systems and evaluation. **SUPPORTED.** Processes shall benefit from the active support of the UN system and other multilateral institutions including the Secretary-General's voluntary common reporting guidelines which may be used by countries in the preparation of their VNRs.

The United States of America (USA), commonly known as the United States (U.S. or US), or America, is a country primarily located in North America, consisting of 50 states, a federal district, five major self-governing territories, and various possessions. At 3.8 million square miles (9.8 million square kilometers), it is the world's third- or fourth-largest country by total area. With a population of over 328 million, it is the third most populous country in the world. The national capital is Washington, D.C.

The Global Engagement Center's Special Report on Russia's Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda provides the first-ever comprehensive analysis of Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. With the release of this report, the Global Engagement Center here at the Department of State is fulfilling its congressional mandate and advancing this administration and Congress's goal of countering foreign disinformation and propaganda that's aimed at the United States and its allies and partners. Across the globe, multilateralism appears in crisis. Skepticism of the benefits of a multilateral order grounded in underlying liberal principles is manifesting throughout the Western world. The United States, the system's imperfect cornerstone, scorns a growing number of multilateral institutions and norms each day. Within Europe, Brexit and discord over the European Union's (EU) future is undercutting the EU as a regional multilateral pillar, alongside the supranational bloc's capacity as a global actor. Simultaneously, a more assertive China and Russia are seeking to reshape multilateralism, challenging the foundational liberal principles that have guided the post-Cold War ...

On a global scale, the population aged 85 and over is projected to increase by 151 per cent between 2005 and 2030, compared to a 104 per cent increase for the population aged 65 and over and a 21 per cent increase for the population under 65 (Bengston and Lowenstein 2004). The most striking increase will occur in Japan: by 2030, nearly 24 per cent of all older Japanese are expected to be at least 85 years old. In the United States, for example, nine per cent of the 65-and-over population is divorced or separated compared to 17 per cent of people aged 55 to 64 and 18 per cent of people aged 45 to 54 (Manton and Gu 2001). This is not the case in China. By 2030, there will be only two working-age people to support every retiree.